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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on appeal from a 
final order of the district court entered September 28, 1999, 
granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant 
Chrysler Motors pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) after the 
close of all the evidence on plaintiff Northview Motors's 
breach of contract and Automobile Dealers Day in Court 
Act ("ADDCA"), 15 U.S.C. SS 1221-25, claims. Northview 
also appeals from (1) an order entered March 7, 1995, to 
the extent that it granted Chrysler summary judgment on 
Northview's Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act ("BVA"), Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 63, SS 818.1 et seq., claims on the ground 
that they were barred by the statute of limitations and (2) 
an order entered February 9, 1996, to the extent it granted 
Chrysler summary judgment on Northview's claim for 
violation of a provision of Pennsylvania's Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC") which obligates contracting 
parties to act in good faith. See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 1203. We will affirm the orders entered by the district 
court, although we do so with respect to the March 7, 1995 
and February 9, 1996 orders for reasons which differ from 
those the district court set forth. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
At the times material to this action, Northview, a 
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was an automobile dealership 
franchise selling and servicing Jeep and Eagle vehicles. 
 
                                2 
  
Frank Cuda, Northview's sole shareholder, oversaw the 
dealership's operations. Chrysler, a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Detroit, Michigan, at 
the times material to this opinion manufactured Jeep and 
Eagle vehicles as successor to American Motors 
Corporation. 
 
Cuda had been involved in the automobile industry since 
he was a child. See app. at 258. He began in the industry 
by working at his father's dealership between 1954 and 
1968. See id. at 260. In 1968, Northview began selling new 
cars as an American Motors dealer in the North Hills 
section of Pittsburgh. See id. at 261. Cuda testified that 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Northview was a 
successful dealership consistently ranking as one of the top 
one hundred American Motors dealerships in the nation. 
See id. at 287. As an American Motors dealership, 
Northview marketed both the Jeep and Eagle lines of 
vehicles. 
 
This case arose directly from events commencing on or 
about December 11, 1987, when Northview entered into an 
American Motors Sales Corporation Eagle Sales and Service 
Agreement ("Eagle SSA") and an American Motors Sales 
Corporation Jeep Sales and Service Agreement ("Jeep SSA") 
(collectively, the "SSAs"). Chrysler subsequently acquired 
American Motors Sales Corporation's Jeep and Eagle lines 
and became its successor in interest to the Jeep and Eagle 
SSAs in contractual privity with Northview.1 
 
Inasmuch as the suit Northview filed against Chrysler 
evolved out of the two SSAs to which Chrysler became a 
party after it purchased American Motors's Jeep and Eagle 
product lines, we set forth significant parallel portions of 
the agreements. Section 11(a) of the SSAs obligated 
Northview to use its best efforts to sell aggressively and 
effectively each and every model of the Jeep and Eagle 
product lines. See, e.g., exhs. at 152. Section 12 required 
that Northview be a member in good standing of the Dealer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There was testimony that Chrysler acquired American Motors in the 
summer of 1987 but even if this is so our result would be the same as 
that we reach. 
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Advertising Association, an association which advertised 
lines of vehicles sold by its dealer members. See id. at 156. 
 
Section 28 of the SSAs governed their termination. See 
exhs. at 161. It provided, in relevant part: 
 
       (C) Notwithstanding the provisions above, this 
       Agreement will terminate automatically without notice 
       from either party on: 
 
       . . . (vi) the failure of DEALER to fully conduct its 
       Dealership Operations for seven (7) consecutive 
       business days . . . 
 
Id. at 162 (emphasis added). 
 
Northview asserts that Chrysler had problems with the 
allocation of vehicles and parts availability immediately 
following the absorption of the Jeep and Eagle dealers into 
the Chrysler system. Thus, Northview presented evidence 
that it continuously was unable to obtain desired vehicles 
from Chrysler to sell to the public and was unable to fill a 
fleet order for Alamo Rent-A-Car. See id. at 305. 
 
In addition to the supply problems Northview experienced 
under Chrysler, it asserts that it had problems because it 
was unable to obtain answers from local Chrysler 
management concerning questions critical to the efficient 
operation of its dealership. For example, Northview asserts 
that Chrysler never explained its system for new vehicle 
allocation properly, despite Northview's numerous attempts 
to obtain the information. Further, Northview alleges that 
Chrysler never gave it a sufficient explanation of its 
warranty processing system which is known as Expense Per 
Unit Repaired or EPUR. Northview argues that the lack of 
an adequate explanation caused its service department to 
be audited and placed in a restrictive warranty approval 
category. 
 
Clearly there was animosity between Northview personnel 
and Cuda on the one hand and local Chrysler management, 
or zone employees, on the other. Northview asserts that the 
only response Chrysler gave it to its inquiries about 
Chrysler's processes was "That's the system." Chrysler 
employees, however, documented instances in which Cuda 
was uncooperative and verbally abusive towards them. 
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Northview asserts that its supply problems and the 
confusion at the dealership concerning Chrysler's operating 
procedures, combined with the personal animosity between 
Northview and Cuda and Chrysler zone personnel, caused 
it increasing financial problems. Northview claims that 
because it could not obtain vehicles it could sell, and 
instead was left with unwanted or slow moving vehicles, it 
was forced to sell vehicles out of trust.2  When Mellon Bank, 
Northview's floor plan lender, discovered that Northview 
was selling out of trust, it revoked Northview'sfloor plan 
agreement and required Northview to enter into an 
agreement for repayment of its loan. When Northview was 
unable to make the required payments, Mellon Bank closed 
the dealership on July 10, 1991. 
 
Upon learning that Northview was closed for business, 
Chrysler, on July 19, 1991, sent it notice that it was 
canceling the Jeep and Eagle SSAs. After Northview failed 
in attempts to sell its dealership, it filed for protection 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, but the 
bankruptcy court would not allow for a restructuring of the 
failing dealership. Chrysler sent its final notice of 
termination to Northview on December 12, 1991. 
 
Although Northview argues that its financial troubles 
were attributable directly to the actions of Chrysler and its 
employees, plainly other factors contributed to its problems. 
Notably, in May 1984, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
filed suit against Northview alleging that it committed 109 
separate violations of Pennsylvania's consumer protection 
laws, see app. at 605, an action that led to negative press 
coverage of Northview. See id. at 609-10. During the trial 
concerning the consumer fraud violations in May 1988, the 
Pittsburgh Press quoted Cuda as stating that the lawsuit 
had cost Northview a lot of money and that Northview's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A dealer will sell out of trust when it has afloor plan agreement with 
a financial institution for it to lend money to the dealer to fund the 
purchase of new vehicles. Under the floor plan, as the vehicles are sold, 
the dealer is responsible for repayments of the loan. The dealer sells out 
of trust when it sells vehicles without making payments to the financial 
institution as required by the agreement, but rather keeps the funds 
within the dealership for other purposes or otherwise utilizes the funds. 
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sales had "plunged from . . . one hundred ten cars a month 
to twenty or thirty cars." Id. at 603. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Northview and Cuda, individually, filed the complaint in 
this action in the district court on October 20, 1993, 
alleging claims predicated on Chrysler's alleged breach of 
contract and violation of state and federal statutory law, 
including claims under the BVA, the UCC, and the ADDCA. 
In particular, count one alleged that Chrysler breached the 
Jeep and Eagle SSAs as well as various statutory and 
contractual duties of good faith by conduct which 
demonstrated its: 
 
       (a) failure to act in good faith; 
 
       (b) failure to provide financial assistance as promised; 
 
       (c) failure to provide products and vehicles; 
 
       (d) failure to treat dealership [(Northview)] in equitable 
       manner; and 
 
       (e) discriminatory practices against Plaintiffs. 
 
Northview alleged that as a result of this conduct it was 
forced to cease doing business and that the Jeep and Eagle 
SSAs were terminated on July 10, 1991. 
 
In count two, Northview and Cuda alleged that Chrysler, 
through its acts and omissions, violated the BVA. 
Specifically, the count alleged that Chrysler violated the 
following provisions of the Act by coercing Northview with 
respect to: 
 
       (a) S 818.9(a)(1) - ordering or accepting delivery of new 
       vehicles which were not voluntarily ordered; 
 
       (b) S 818.9(a)(3) - participating monetarily in advertising 
       campaign at expenses of new vehicle dealer; and 
 
       (c) S 818.9(a)(4) - threatening to terminate or cancel 
       franchise unless prejudicial act performed by dealer; 
 
The count also charged Chrysler with: 
 
       (d) S 818.9(b)(1) - failure to deliver new vehicles; 
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       (e) S 818.9(b)(2) - discriminating among its new vehicle 
       dealers; and 
 
       (f) S 818.9(c) - unfairly and without just provocation 
       canceling the franchise of the new vehicle dealer. 3 
 
In count three, Northview and Cuda alleged that 
Chrysler's intentional and/or negligent acts constituted 
tortious interference with business relations. Count four 
alleged Chrysler breached its duty of good faith in the UCC. 
Count five alleged that Chrysler violated the ADDCA. 
 
In conclusion, Northview and Cuda alleged that "[a]s a 
result of the numerous breaches of good faith and wrongful 
and intentional acts by [Chrysler], Plaintiffs have suffered 
substantial damages including, but not limited to, the loss 
of Frank Cuda's life savings and investment, loss of profits 
including future profits, loss of franchise auto dealership 
and land, loss of salary and benefits." Thus, Northview and 
Cuda sought compensatory and punitive damages as well 
as attorneys' fees and costs. 
 
On August 16, 1994, Chrysler filed a motion seeking a 
summary judgment dismissing all of Cuda's claims. The 
district court, in an opinion and order entered on March 7, 
1995, granted that motion in an order from which Cuda 
does not appeal. As we shall explain, the court also 
partially granted Chrysler summary judgment against 
Northview at that time, even though Chrysler did not then 
move for summary judgment against Northview. Northview 
does appeal from that order. 
 
On August 7, 1995, Chrysler filed a motion for summary 
judgment against Northview. Following a hearing on the 
motion held on December 6, 1995, the district court issued 
an order, entered on February 9, 1996, partially granting 
and partially denying the motion. On March 11, 1996, 
Chrysler filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
district court denied by order entered March 14, 1996. 
 
The court held a pretrial conference on May 6, 1996. 
Following the conference, the parties apparently settled the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. These provisions were renumbered in 1996 as Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, 
SS 818.12 and 818.13. 
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case on May 16, 1996, and thus the district court closed 
the case. The settlement, however, was not consummated, 
leading Chrysler on February 18, 1998, to file a motion to 
enforce the settlement agreement. On June 10, 1998, the 
district court entered an order granting the motion to 
enforce the settlement. 
 
On July 7, 1998, Northview and Cuda filed an appeal 
from the order granting the motion to enforce the 
settlement. On June 18, 1999, for reasons implicating 
Northview's bankruptcy which we need not explain, we 
reversed the order of the district court enforcing the 
settlement and remanded the matter to the district court 
for further proceedings. See Northview Motors, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
There was a jury trial on the remand starting on 
September 14, 1999. At the close of Northview's case, 
Chrysler unsuccessfully moved for a judgment as a matter 
of law. Thereafter, Chrysler presented its case and the trial 
concluded on September 28, 1999. Chrysler then renewed 
its motion for a judgment as a matter of law and on 
September 28, 1999, the district court granted the motion, 
setting forth its reasons on the record. On October 26, 
1999, Northview timely filed a notice of appeal from the 
September 28, 1999 order. Inasmuch as Northview appeals 
from the March 7, 1995, February 6, 1996 and September 
28, 1999 orders, we describe them in some detail. 
 
a. The March 7, 1995 Order 
 
In its memorandum opinion and order entered March 7, 
1995, the district court addressed Chrysler's motion for 
summary judgment with respect to Cuda's claims. The 
court determined that Cuda lacked standing to assert 
claims pursuant to the ADDCA, and accordingly entered 
judgment in Chrysler's favor on those claims. The district 
court also concluded that Cuda had failed to establish 
essential elements of his breach of contract and UCC 
claims in that he did not allege that he was a party to the 
agreements involved or that Chrysler owed him a duty of 
good faith under the UCC. Finally, with respect to Cuda, 
the district court determined that the statute of limitations 
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barred his allegations of tortious interference with contract 
and violation of the BVA. 
 
On its own motion, the court granted Chrysler summary 
judgment on statute of limitations grounds on Northview's 
claims of tortious interference and violations of the BVA, as 
the factual bases for these claims were the same as the 
bases for Cuda's claims. On this appeal, Northview 
challenges the district court's dismissal of its BVA claims 
as barred by the statute of limitations but, as we have 
indicated, Cuda does not appeal. 
 
b. The February 9, 1996 Order 
 
In its memorandum opinion and order entered on 
February 9, 1999, the district court addressed Chrysler's 
motion for summary judgment as to Northview's claims for 
violations of the ADDCA, breach of contract and breach of 
the duty to act in good faith as specified in the UCC, 13 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 1011 et seq. The court partially granted 
and partially denied the motion. The court found that 
Northview asserted two distinct ADDCA causes of action, 
one based upon both Chrysler's failure to act in good faith 
in performing and complying with the terms of the SSAs 
and the other for Chrysler's lack of good faith in 
terminating Northview's franchise. 
 
The court determined that substantial questions of fact 
remained to be resolved with respect to Northview's ADDCA 
claim relating to the termination of its franchises. 
Accordingly, it denied the motion for summary judgment as 
to the ADDCA lack of good faith termination claim. 
 
Chrysler, however, also moved for summary judgment as 
to Northview's claim that it failed to act in good faith in 
performing and complying with the provisions of the 
franchise agreements. Specifically, Chrysler asserted that 
the bad faith acts of which Northview complained were 
insufficient to state a claim or, in the alternative, were 
barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that 
the following alleged bad faith acts were insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to state a claim under the ADDCA: 
 
       (1) the alleged failure of Chrysler to provide parts and 
       vehicles to Northview; 
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       (2) the alleged failure of Chrysler to provide financial 
       assistance to Northview; 
 
       (3) the alleged failure of Chrysler to provide Northview 
       with copies of the District Service Manager's Reports; 
 
       (4) the alleged failure of Chrysler to provide adequate 
       training for Northview personnel concerning Chrysler's 
       procedures, programs, and computer systems; 
 
       (5) the performance of a warranty audit by Chrysler on 
       the Northview dealership. 
 
App. at 25. 
 
The district court reasoned that Northview had failed to 
present sufficient evidence of express or implied coercion, 
as required under the ADDCA, to allow it to proceed with 
the good faith and performance aspect of its ADDCA cause 
of action. In the absence of evidence that it coerced or 
intimated Northview, the district court determined that 
Chrysler was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
this claim. 
 
The district court found that only two of Northview's 
allegations, other than those relating to termination, could 
state a claim for relief under the ADDCA: (1) that Chrysler 
threatened to terminate its franchise agreements with 
Northview unless Northview agreed to join an advertising 
campaign; and (2) that Chrysler forced Northview to accept 
new vehicles that it did not want or need. See id. at 26. 
This conduct, however, occurred in 1988 and 1987, 
respectively, and, as a result, the court found that any 
claims based upon these allegations were barred by the 
statute of limitations. See id. at 26-28. The court also noted 
that Northview had agreed expressly in the SSAs to"at all 
times be a member in good standing of the . . . Dealer 
Advertising Association." Id. at 28 n.5. The district court 
therefore concluded that Northview's complaint with respect 
to being forced to join an advertising campaign failed 
inasmuch as the use of coercion to enforce a valid 
contractual provision is not wrongful under the ADDCA. 
See id. (citing Empire Volkswagen, Inc. v. World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
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When it addressed Northview's claim for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the UCC, the 
district court found that Pennsylvania law did not provide 
for an independent cause of action for breach of the 
covenant of good faith. See app. at 33. The district court 
based this determination on the comment to 13 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 1203, Pennsylvania's version of the UCC 
provision codifying the obligation to act in good faith. See 
id. The comment provides: 
 
       This section does not support an independent cause of 
       action for failure to perform or enforce in good faith. 
       Rather, this section means that a failure to perform or 
       enforce, in good faith, a specific duty or obligation 
       under the contract, constitutes a breach of that 
       contract or makes unavailable, under the particular 
       circumstances, a remedial right or power. This 
       distinction makes it clear that the doctrine of good 
       faith merely directs a court towards interpreting 
       contracts within the commercial context in which they 
       are created, performed, and enforced, and does not 
       create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness 
       which can be independently breached. 
 
13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1203, UCC Comment. 
Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of 
Chrysler on Northview's UCC claim. 
 
c. Claims that Proceeded to Trial 
 
Although Northview has focused its briefs on the Rule 
50(a) order on the ADDCA claim, at trial it advanced both 
its breach of contract claim and its ADDCA claim which, in 
light of the district court's earlier rulings, was limited to a 
cause of action for "bad faith" termination of Northview's 
franchises. Accordingly, the court did not admit evidence of 
Northview's being forced to take unwanted cars, the 
warranty audits, and the failure of Chrysler to provide 
needed vehicles as substantive evidence to support a 
damages recovery by Northview for these alleged 
wrongdoings. Rather, the court admitted this evidence 
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) solely for the purpose of 
establishing motive or intent, i.e., that Chrysler terminated 
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the SSAs in July 1991 to force Northview out of business in 
furtherance of its business plan to terminate stand alone 
Jeep and Eagle dealerships and replace them with 
dealerships selling other Chrysler lines. 
 
d. The September 28, 1999 Order and Record Statements 
 
As we have indicated, after the close of all of the 
evidence, the district court issued an order, dated 
September 28, 1999, granting judgment as a matter of law 
in favor of Chrysler on all remaining claims pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), i.e., those under the ADDCA for 
termination of Northview's franchise and for breach of 
contract. The court set forth its reasons for granting 
judgment in favor of Chrysler on the record. See  app. at 
1279-80. 
 
After hearing argument from the parties, the district 
court explained as follows: 
 
       These points that were given to me, there are -- here's 
       what they say, that they say, what was it, coercive and 
       discriminatory practices beginning in 1988; failed to 
       allocate and deliver the appropriate quantity of cars; 
       forced Northview to accept unwanted vehicles; 
       performed a retaliatory warranty audit. 
 
       Now, clearly the audit was performed. There's no 
       contract claim or Dealer Day in Court claim for-- that 
       it's barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, 
       the audit was authorized under the contract. 
       Improperly placed the dealership on prior approval for 
       warranty and repair work. Well, that was done in 19-- 
       early in `88, before the audit occurred. That's also 
       barred. 
 
       And failed to act in good faith in complying with the 
       contract, with the ulterior purpose of reducing its 
       dealer body; there is no evidence of that at all. 
 
       * * * * 
 
       Now, there just -- there isn't any evidence of these 
       things being a violation of the contract or -- to the 
       extent that it's claimed a violation of the Dealer Day in 
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       Court Act, the only specific matters about which 
       evidence was offered occurred prior to the bar of the -- 
       prior to the time bar and you can't argue it. 
 
       This is what's causing me the trouble in this case I am 
       having. You know, I'm considering the Rule 50 motion; 
       I'm left not knowing what it is I can charge this jury. 
 
       * * * * 
 
       I mean what the theory really is is not that they-- I 
       don't think it can be really the termination, because 
       the termination was automatic according to the 
       contract. It's an automatic termination if it's-- if you 
       don't do business for seven consecutive days. It's not a 
       matter of we have the option to do it or not to do it; it 
       says in the agreement that it's an automatic 
       termination. 
 
       So what the complaint really is is that all these 
       practices were motivated in order to get Northview out 
       of business, but the way they did it was to make sure 
       he went into bankruptcy or he became insolvent and 
       couldn't operate anymore. That's apparently the theory. 
       And that because they became insolvent, they then 
       were -- they were taken -- their assets were taken over 
       by Mellon Bank, they couldn't possibly have done 
       business anymore. 
 
       * * * * 
 
       All of this, like the audit for instance, is barred by the 
       statute of limitations. You can't claim that as a 
       violation of the Dealer Day in Court Act. You just can't. 
       Nor can you claim it is a violation of the contract. In 
       fact, the contract authorizes the audit. 
 
       This is the trouble I'm having with this case, and I'll 
       tell you -- I honestly -- I don't know how I can 
       construct a charge. I don't think I understand what the 
       theories are well enough except -- and I think I'm-- I 
       don't like to do it, but I think I have to grant the Rule 
       50 motion. I just don't think there is enough here to 
       get to a jury with, no matter how you try to put it 
       together. 
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       * * * * 
 
       So I'm going to grant the Rule 50 motion. Maybe the 
       Court of Appeals will tell me what to do. 
 
App. at 1272-76. 
 
The district court then clarified its opinion by stating: 
 
       I just don't think there's enough evidence that has 
       been offered and produced in this case to submit to a 
       jury on a Dealer Day in Court or breach of contract 
       claim. That's what I think. And I'm -- when I'm trying 
       to figure out what to say to tell the jury to instruct 
       them, I don't know what to instruct them. I don't know 
       what breach of contract occurred that isn't barred by 
       the statute of limitations. I don't know what Dealer Day 
       in Court Act violation that occurred that also isn't 
       barred by the statute of limitations. There just isn't 
       any. 
 




This case, although pleaded in conjunction with 
numerous state contract and statutory law claims, in part 
arose under the ADDCA, 15 U.S.C. SS 1221-25. 
Accordingly, the district court had federal question 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. Inasmuch as the 
parties were not of diverse citizenship, the district court 
exercised jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). As Northview 
appeals from a final order of the district court, appellate 
jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. S 1291.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In its notice of appeal, Northview states that it is appealing only 
from 
the order entered September 28, 1999. Northview's opening brief, 
however, additionally raises challenges to the orders entered March 7, 
1995 and February 9, 1996. We have jurisdiction to hear the latter 
arguments as notices of appeal are construed to include earlier orders 
that were "non-final" at the time of issuance if there is a connection 
between the order specified in the notice of appeal and the earlier 
orders. 
See Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 776-77 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 




A. Points Raised 
 
On this appeal Northview raises the following points: 
 
       I. The district court erred in applying the incorr ect 
       statute of limitations to Northview's Pennsylvania 
       Board of Vehicles Act; 
 
       II. The district court erred in granting summary 
       judgment for Chrysler on Northview's independent good 
       faith claim by disregarding Pennsylvania precedent 
       regarding the existence of an independent cause of 
       action based on the breach of an implied duty of good 
       faith present in all franchise agreements; 
 
       III. The district court committed reversible error  by 
       granting Chrysler's motion for directed verdict when 
       the evidence presented allows a reasonable jury to infer 
       that Chrysler intended to get rid of their stand alone 
       Jeep and Eagle dealers and engaged in a course of 
       conduct to force Northview's termination of its 
       franchise agreement. 
 
B. Standard of Review 
 
As we noted, to the extent appealed, the March 7, 1995 
and February 9, 1996 orders of the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Chrysler. Our review of the 
order of the district court on a motion for summary 
judgment is plenary. See Seibert v. Nusbaum, Stein, 
Goldstein, Bronstein & Compeau, 167 F.3d 166, 170 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling- 
Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.1993). We will 
affirm only if we conclude that the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, show that the party who obtained 
summary judgment on a point was entitled to that 
judgment as a matter of law and that there was no genuine 
dispute of material fact standing in his or her way. See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
After trial on Northview's breach of contract and ADDCA 
claims, the district court granted Chrysler's Rule 50(a) 
motion for judgment as a matter of law. We utilize a 
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plenary standard to review a grant or denial of a judgment 
as a matter of law. See Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 154 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1998); Salas v. Wang, 
846 F.2d 897, 902 (3d Cir. 1988). "[A] directed verdict is 
mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably 
support only one conclusion." McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. 
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 818 (1991). A 
court should grant such a motion only "if, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and 
giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable 
inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could find liability." Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993); see also Shade, 
154 F.3d at 149. 
 
C. The Appropriate Statute of Limitations for Board of 
       Vehicles Act Claims 
 
The Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act ("BVA") provided 
at the times applicable here for a cause of action on the 
following terms: 
 
       (a) Action for damages.--Notwithstanding the terms, 
       provisions or conditions of any agreement or franchise 
       or other terms or provisions of any novation, waiver or 
       other written instrument, any person who is or may be 
       injured by a violation of a provision of this act or any 
       party to a franchise who is so injured in his business 
       or property by a violation of a provision of this act 
       relating to that franchise, or any person so injured 
       because he refuses to accede to a proposal for an 
       arrangement which, if consummated, would be in 
       violation of this act, may bring an action for damages 
       and equitable relief, including injunctive relief, in any 
       court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
       (b) Punitive Damages.--If any person engages in 
       continued multiple violations of a provision or 
       provisions of this act, the court may award punitive 
       damages in addition to any other damages under this 
       act. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.20 (renumbered in 1996 as Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.29). 
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In relevant part, the BVA prohibited the following 
conduct: 
 
       (a) Unlawful acts by manufacturers.--It shall be a 
       violation for any manufacturer, factory branch, 
       distributor, field representative, officer, agent or any 
       representative whatsoever of such manufacturer, 
       factory branch or distributor licensed under this act to 
       require, attempt to require, coerce or attempt to coerce 
       any new vehicle dealer in this Commonwealth to: 
 
        (1) Order or accept delivery of any new vehicle, part 
       or accessory thereof, equipment or any other 
       commodity not required by law which shall not have 
       been voluntarily ordered by the new vehicle dealer, 
       except that this paragraph is not intended to modify or 
       supersede any terms or provisions of the franchise 
       requiring new vehicle dealers to market a 
       representative line of those vehicles which the 
       manufacturer or distributor is publicly advertising. 
 
        (2) Order or accept delivery of any new vehicle with 
       special features, accessories or equipment not included 
       in the list price of such vehicles as publicly advertised 
       by the manufacturer or distributor. 
 
        (3) Participate monetarily in an advertising campaign 
       or contest or to purchase unnecessary or unreasonable 
       quantities of any promotional materials, training 
       materials, showroom or other display decorations or 
       materials at the expense of the new vehicle dealer. 
 
        (4) Enter into any agreement with the manufacturer 
       or to do any other act prejudicial to the new vehicle 
       dealer by threatening to terminate or cancel a franchise 
       or any contractual agreement existing between the 
       dealer and the manufacturer, except that this 
       paragraph is not intended to preclude the 
       manufacturer or distributor from insisting on 
       compliance with the reasonable terms or provisions of 
       the franchise or other contractual agreement and 
       notice in good faith to any new vehicle dealer of the 
       new vehicle dealer's violation of such terms or 
       provisions shall not constitute a violation of the act. 
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Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.9 (renumbered in 1996 as Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.12). 
 
The BVA, however, does not include a statute of 
limitations. Further, insofar as we are aware, the 
Pennsylvania courts have not issued a published opinion 
deciding which statute of limitations is applicable to a claim 
brought under the BVA. As a result, we must make a 
prediction as to which statute of limitations the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply in a BVA action, 
a process that requires us to examine the theories of 
liability underlying Northview's claims. See Barnes v. The 
American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 151 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
The district court sua sponte applied a one-year statute 
of limitations based upon its determination that 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5523 governed the time for bringing a 
BVA claim. See app. at 14. The court, however, relied upon 
a version of section 5523 no longer in effect at the time of 
its decision or at the time this cause of action accrued as 
the legislature had amended section 5523 in 1982 to read 
as follows: 
 
       The following actions and proceedings must be 
       commenced within one year: 
 
       (1) An action for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy. 
 
       (2) An action upon a bond given as a security by a 
       party in any matter, except a bond given by a 
       condemnor in an eminent domain proceeding. 
 
       (3) An action upon any payment or performance bond. 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5523. The parties are in accord 
that none of the actions or proceedings listed in section 
5523, as amended in 1982, are applicable to a cause of 
action brought under the BVA and we are in agreement 
with them. Thus, the district court erred when it applied a 
one-year statute of limitations to the BVA claims in this 
matter and Chrysler acknowledges this point. 
 
Northview argues that the district court should have 
applied Pennsylvania's "catch-all" six-year statute of 
limitations to its BVA claims in which event the claims 
would have been timely. See Appellant Br. at 10 (citing 42 
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Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5527). Section 5527 provides that 
"[a]ny civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to 
another limitation specified in this chapter nor excluded 
from the application of a period of limitation by section 
5531 . . . must be commenced within in six years." Because 
we find the BVA claims are the subject of another period of 
limitation specified in the relevant statutory chapter, the 
six-year statute of limitations is not applicable here. 
 
Chrysler suggested in the district court when moving for 
summary judgment against Cuda that a two-year statute of 
limitations applies to the BVA claims. It takes the same 
position with respect to Northview's BVA claims. In support 
of its argument for the application of a two-year statute of 
limitations, Chrysler cites to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 5524(5) which states that an "action upon a statute for a 
civil penalty or forfeiture" must be commenced within two 
years. See Appellee Br. at 62. Chrysler also relies on Nelson 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 988 F. Supp. 527, 
531, 534 & n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1997), see Appellee Br. at 62, as 
further support for its contention that a two-year statute of 
limitations governs BVA claims. Nelson applied section 
5524(7) in finding a two-year statute of limitations 
applicable to an action brought under the Pennsylvania 
statute for a bad faith claim against an insurer. See Nelson, 
988 F. Supp. at 531, 534 & n.11. Thus, Northview is in 
effect contending that both subsections (5) and (7) are 
applicable.5 
 
But Northview persuasively argues that section 5524(5) is 
not applicable to the BVA because the statute is not penal 
and instead is remedial. See Appellant Br. at 11-15. While 
there are not any reported cases addressing the question of 
whether the BVA is remedial or penal in nature, its 
language expresses its remedial nature. See Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 63, S 818.20 (renumbered in 1996 as Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
63, S 818.29) (providing for the recovery of damages or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In the district court when moving for summary judgment against 
Cuda, Chrysler advanced an argument that section 5524(5) was 
applicable and did not rely on section 5524(7). We will not hold, 
however, that it waived a subsection (7) argument because it did not 
move for summary judgment against Northview on any limitations basis. 
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equitable relief by those injured by the actions of a 
manufacturer). Moreover, in 1996 the legislature deleted a 
provision in section 818.20 that had provided for punitive 
damages in the event of multiple violations on the BVA, and 
renumbered the section as 818.29. The legislature thus 
emphasized the Act's remedial rather than penal nature. 
Further, similar provisions of the ADDCA have been found 
to be remedial, see Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 
F.2d 121, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1962), as have been like state 
statutes. See, e.g., American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Bill 
Kummer, Inc., 65 F.3d 1381, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(Wisconsin Motor Vehicle Dealer Law is remedial because 
enacted to protect dealers from unfair and coercive 
manufacturers); Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes- 
Benz of North America, Inc., 32 F.3d 528. 531-33 (11th Cir. 
1994) (Florida Dealer Protection Act is remedial); Earl Evans 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 598 N.E.2d 1187, 
1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (Ohio Dealer Act is remedial). 
Consequently, we conclude that the BVA is remedial rather 
than penal in nature and, accordingly, section 5524(5) is 
not applicable to this action. 
 
We are satisfied, however, that section 5524(7) is 
applicable here. Subsection 7 provides that any action or 
proceeding "to recover damages for injury to person or 
property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or 
otherwise tortious conduct" must be commenced within two 
years. The BVA provides a cause of action to a franchisee 
that is injured in his or her business or property by a 
violation of the Act and Northview brought this action 
making such claims. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 8180.20. 
 
The two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 
5524(7) has been found to be applicable to other causes of 
action seeking a statutory remedy for injuries. As we 
mentioned, Nelson relied upon section 5524(7) in applying 
a two-year statute of limitations to an action brought under 
the Pennsylvania statute for a bad faith claim against an 
insurer. See Nelson, 988 F. Supp. at 534. Further, the two- 
year statute of limitations period has been held applicable 
to the Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act. See 
AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Harris, 759 F. Supp. 1141, 
1146 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding claims for fraud and failure to 
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deal in good faith most analogous to those claims set forth 
in section 5524(7)). Also, claims of discrimination under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act are subject to a two- 
year statute of limitations under section 5524(7). See 
Raleigh v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 550 A.2d 1013, 1014 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); see also Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. 
City of Philadelphia, 142 F.2d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(applying section 5524 to an action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983). Here Northview argues Chrysler violated the BVA 
because of its coercive tactics used to force Northview out 
of business and the discriminatory manner in which it 
treated Northview. Thus, it alleged intentional or tortious 
conduct and, accordingly, we predict that the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania would apply the two-year statute of 
limitations found in section 5524(7) to the BVA, at least in 
the circumstances Northview asserts here. 
 
Counsel for Northview agreed at oral argument that the 
BVA cause of action accrued, at the latest, when Chrysler 
sent the original notice of termination of the SSAs in July 
1991, which was more than two years before it filed this 
suit in October 1993. As a result, Northview did not timely 
file its BVA claims. Accordingly, the district court's 
dismissal of the claims was proper, though for the alternate 
reasons we have set forth rather than for those upon which 
the district court relied. 
 
D. Northview's Breach of Good Faith Claim 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Chrysler on count four of the complaint after finding that 
the UCC, as adopted by Pennsylvania, did not create an 
independent cause of action for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith, even though the UCC in 13 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1203 provides that "[e]very contract or 
duty within this title imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement."6 The UCC, however, is not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. At oral argument, counsel for Northview seemed to be arguing that the 
claim for breach of the duty of good faith, rather than being an 
independent cause of action, colored Northview's breach of contract 
claims. This suggestion runs contrary to the complaint and the 
arguments presented in the briefs. In count four of the complaint, 
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the sole source of the obligation to perform in good faith 
because the Pennsylvania courts have cited Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S 205 for the proposition that every 
contract has an implied term that the parties will perform 
their duties in good faith, and in its brief Northview did not 
confine its claim that Chrysler did not act in good faith to 
the UCC. See, e.g., Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1213 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). In practice, however, the courts have 
recognized an independent cause of action for breach of a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing only in very limited 
circumstances. See, e.g., Creeger Brick and Building Supply, 
Inc. v. Mid-State Bank and Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151, 153, 
154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (duty is limited to insurers' 
dealings with insureds, franchisors' dealings with 
franchisees and other narrow situations); see also Parkway 
Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 701 (3d Cir. 
1993) ("[U]nder Pennsylvania law, every contract does not 
imply a duty of good faith."). 
 
Courts have utilized the good faith duty as an interpretive 
tool to determine the parties' justifiable expectations in the 
context of a breach of contract action, but that duty is not 
divorced from the specific clauses of the contract and 
cannot be used to override an express contractual term. 
See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 66 
F.3d 604, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1995); USX Corp. v. Prime 
Leasing, Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 438 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, a 
party is not entitled to maintain an implied duty of good 
faith claim where the allegations of bad faith are"identical 
to" a claim for "relief under an established cause of action." 
Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d at 701- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Northview pleaded a separate and independent cause of action under the 
UCC. In addition, Northview argued that it "has a cause of action based 
upon damages incurred from Chrysler's breach of this implied good faith 
duty." See Appellant Br. at 16. We find Northview would not be entitled 
to recovery for breach of the duty of good faith unless an independent 
cause of action could be pleaded. Accordingly, we review the law of 
Pennsylvania to determine if such a cause of action exists and to predict 
whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would allow for such a 
cause of action. Our disposition rejects the existence of this cause of 
action on the facts here both at common law and under the UCC. 
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02 (noting that Parkway's allegations concerning the closing 
of a garage in bad faith were identical to its allegations 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and, therefore, there was no reason 
to imply a separate cause of action for breach of a duty of 
good faith); see also D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. 
Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981) (court refused 
to recognize separate cause of action for breach of duty of 
good faith where adequate remedy was provided under 
Unfair Insurance Practices Act.); Creeger Brick v. Mid-State 
Bank, 560 A.2d at 154-55; AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 542 A.2d 90, 93-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988), aff 'd in part & rev'd on other grounds 584 A.2d 915 
(Pa. 1990); Standard Pipeline Coating Co. v. Solomon & 
Teslovich, Inc., 496 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(court would not create a tort remedy where there was an 
adequate remedy to address the claims in existing torts and 
contracts law). 
 
In view of these precedents, we believe that if a plaintiff 
alleging a violation of the implied covenant of good faith 
also were to file a claim for fraud based on the same set of 
facts, Pennsylvania courts likely would decline to proceed 
with the claim alleging bad faith. Instead, Pennsylvania 
courts would consider the other claims in the plaintiff 's 
complaint. Such an approach limits the use of the bad faith 
cause of action to those instances where it is essential. The 
covenant of good faith necessarily is vague and amorphous. 
Without such judicial limitations in its application, every 
plaintiff would have an incentive to include bad faith 
allegations in every contract action. If construed too 
broadly, the doctrine could become an all-embracing 
statement of the parties' obligations under contract law, 
imposing unintended obligations upon parties and 
destroying the mutual benefits created by legally binding 
agreements. Therefore, we predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would not extend the limited duty to 
perform a contract in good faith to a situation such as that 
presented here in which the parties in great detail set forth 
their mutual obligations and rights in the SSAs. We are 
further encouraged to reach this result because Congress 
in the ADDCA, and the legislature in the BVA, specifically 
regulated the relationship between automobile dealers and 
manufacturers. Overall, we are satisfied that, in the face of 
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these detailed provisions setting forth both contractually 
and statutorily the parties' obligations and rights, we 
should not recognize an independent cause of action for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith in this case.7 
Accordingly, the district court appropriately granted 
summary judgment on this claim. 
 
E. Northview's ADDCA Claim 
 
The ADDCA is a remedial statute enacted to redress the 
economic imbalance and unequal bargaining power 
between large automobile manufacturers and local 
dealerships, protecting dealers from unfair termination and 
other retaliatory and coercive practices. See, e.g., Maschio v. 
Prestige Motors, 37 F.3d 908, 910 (3d Cir. 1994); Hanley v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 433 F.2d 708, 710-11 (10th Cir. 
1970). It is, essentially, a supplement to the national 
antitrust laws, passed to counter-balance the economic 
leverage a manufacturer has over its ostensibly 
independent dealers, and its "control over [its] product in 
what amounts to quasi-integration to the retail level of 
distribution." H.R.Rep. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3, 
reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4596, 4596, 4598. There 
are four elements of an ADDCA cause of action: (1) the 
plaintiff must be an automobile dealer; (2) the defendant 
must be an "automobile manufacturer" engaged in 
commerce; (3) there must be a manufacturer-dealer 
relationship embodied in a written franchise agreement; 
and (4) the plaintiff must have been injured by the 
defendant's failure to act in good faith. See  15 U.S.C. 
S 1222; Maschio, 37 F.3d at 910; Sherman v. British 
Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 441 (9th Cir. 1979).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In this regard, we note that we have stated that a federal court in a 
diversity case should be reluctant to expand state common law. See Leo 
v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1994). That 
principle also should apply when, as here, a court is exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. After all, regardless of 
the source of its jurisdiction, the principle is valid because a federal 
court is applying state law. 
 
8. Clearly, the first three of the required elements of an ADDCA claim 
have been met in this case. The only question at trial was whether 
Northview presented facts which would have allowed a reasonable jury to 
have concluded that Chrysler failed to act in good faith, as that term is 
defined by the ADDCA. 
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It is axiomatic that any inquiry as to the meaning of a 
statute must begin with its language. The Act defines the 
term "good faith" as "the duty of each party to any 
franchise . . . to act in a fair and equitable manner toward 
each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from 
coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation 
from the other party. . . ." 15 U.S.C. S 1221(e). The Act, 
however, does not protect dealers against all unfair 
practices, but only against those breaches of good faith 
"evidenced by acts of coercion or intimidation." Salco Corp. 
v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567, 573 (10th Cir. 
1975). The case law plainly requires actual, or threatened, 
coercion or intimidation as an element of an ADDCA claim. 
See General GMC, Inc. v. Volvo White Truck Corp., 918 F.2d 
306, 308 (1st Cir. 1990); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. 
General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 575 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 
1038 (5th Cir. 1981). Consequently, it is well established 
that the duty of "good faith" dealing imposed by the Act 
must be given a narrow, rather than expansive, 
construction. See Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, 
Inc., 567 F.2d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 1978); Milos v. Ford Motor 
Co., 317 F.2d 712, 715-16 (3d Cir. 1963). For example, 
when assessing the elements of a claim under section 
1221(e), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted 
that: 
 
       There is no question that the failure to exercise good 
       faith within the meaning of the Act has a limited and 
       restricted meaning. It is not to be construed liberally. 
       . . . It does not mean `good faith' in a hazy or general 
       way, nor does it mean unfairness. The existence or 
       nonexistence of `good faith' must be determined in the 
       context of actual or threatened coercion or 
       intimidation. 
 
Autohaus Brugger, 567 F.2d at 911 (citations omitted). 
 
The case law interpreting the ADDCA provides some 
guidelines for determining whether a manufacturer has 
been guilty of coercion or intimidation. Thus, a 
manufacturer's coercion of a dealer into relinquishing the 
right to sell competing car lines may be actionable, at least 
if the dealer's franchise agreement gives it the right to make 
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such sales. See, e.g., Cabriolet Porsche Audi, Inc. v. 
American Honda Motor Co., 773 F.2d 1193, 1210 (11th Cir. 
1985) ("We have little doubt that had Honda threatened to 
deny Cabriolet . . . cars to which it was entitled, unless 
Cabriolet provided an exclusive facility, this would be 
evidence of coercion"); Rea v. Ford Motor Co. , 497 F.2d 577, 
582-87 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, a manufacturer's efforts to 
drive a dealer out of business can qualify as bad faith. See 
Junikki Imports, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Co., 335 F. Supp. 593, 
595 (N.D. Ill. 1971); see also Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. 
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 516 (10th Cir. 1976). 
Also, an automobile manufacturer's coercive attempt to 
force unwanted automobiles on a dealer constitutes"bad 
faith." See David R. McGeorge Car Co. v. Leyland Motor 
Sales, Inc., 504 F.2d 52, 55-56 (4th Cir. 1974). 
 
On the other hand, if an ADDCA defendant has 
objectively valid reasons for terminating its relations with a 
dealer, the dealer cannot prevail in an ADDCA action 
absent evidence that the defendant had an ulterior motive 
for its action. See Carroll Kenworth Truck Sales, Inc. v. 
Kenworth Truck Co., 781 F.2d 1520, 1527 & n.4 (11th Cir. 
1986); see also York Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler 
Credit Corp., 447 F.2d 786, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[T]hat 
Chrysler Motors may have had grounds for lawful 
termination of the automobile dealership does not permit 
this court to set aside a jury verdict. . . . The[ADDCA] is 
not as concerned with what the parties did as it is 
concerned with why they did it."). 
 
Our review of the district court's decision on Chrysler's 
Rule 50 motion of necessity is affected by the court's earlier 
ruling concerning the statute of limitations and its repeated 
decisions to admit certain evidence only as proof of motive 
or intent. As noted, the district court concluded that the 
statute of limitations barred allegations premised upon 
Chrysler forcing Northview to take delivery of cars that it 
did not need and forcing it to join an advertising campaign. 
The court also prevented Northview from proffering evidence 
of Chrysler's failure to provide vehicles and parts, the 
performance of the warranty audit and the failure to 
provide proper training as direct evidence for a basis for 
Northview recovering damages. See id. at 24-26. As a 
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result, the court admitted evidence of such "coercive" 
activity only to demonstrate motive or intent -- i.e., that 
Chrysler's July 1991 termination of the SSAs was 
motivated by its desire to force Northview out of business in 
furtherance of Chrysler's business plan to eliminate stand 
alone dealers. 
 
The more direct evidence that Northview offered at trial 
supporting this theory concerned the fact that the SSAs 
were terminated in July 1991 and that certain other stand 
alone Jeep and Eagle Dealerships were closed and then re- 
opened after having been combined with other Chrysler 
dealerships. From this evidence, Northview argues that a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that Chrysler coerced 
or intimidated it into closing its dealership so that Chrysler 
could pair the dealership with another of its vehicle brands. 
 
At argument before us, counsel for Northview confirmed 
that he did not challenge the ADDCA statute of limitations 
and evidentiary rulings of the district court.9 Rather, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In its opening brief, Northview does not make any mention of the 
February 9, 1996 order in its challenges to the district court's decision 
on the Rule 50 motion. In fact, Northview makes only an oblique one- 
sentence reference to the statute of limitations issue. See Appellant Br. 
at 29. Nowhere does Northview expressly challenge the statute of 
limitations ruling or the ruling of the district court to admit certain 
evidence only as proof of motive or intent. The entire focus of 
Northview's 
argument is on the fact that, in light of the evidence of motive and the 
other evidence at trial, its case on wrongful termination was sufficient 
to 
allow a jury to find in its favor on the ADDCA claim. 
 
Interestingly, even though Chrysler prevailed, it challenges the 
admission of the motive or intent evidence. While Chrysler's argument 
along these lines is substantial, see Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 201 
F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2000), we will assume without deciding that the 
district court properly admitted the evidence as bearing on Chrysler's 
motive or intent. Thus, in considering Northview's appeal from the order 
granting Chrysler judgment as a matter of law, we are considering the 
Rule 404(b) evidence. Accordingly, we are not following our long-standing 
practice, see Lightning Lube v. Witco, 4 F.3d at 1198-1200, approved by 
the Supreme Court in Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S.Ct. 1011, 1019-22 
(2000), of considering an appeal from an order granting a judgment as 
a matter of law only on the basis of evidence we determine was admitted 
properly. 
 
                                27 
  
Northview argues that when the evidence it presented is 
considered as proof of Chrysler's bad motive or intent, a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that Chrysler did not 
act in good faith when it terminated Northview. 10 
 
While evidence of improper motive may be sufficient in 
certain franchise terminations cases to create a jury 
question, see Carroll Kenworth Truck Sales, 781 F.2d at 
1527 & n.4; York Chrysler-Plymouth, 447 F.2d at 791-92, 
the evidence presented here was wholly insufficient to raise 
an inference that Chrysler was motivated by a desire to 
close Northview as part of a plan to phase out stand alone 
Jeep and Eagle dealerships. The theory of Northview's case 
appears to rest upon the existence of what has been termed 
Plan 2000. Northview was not allowed to reference Plan 
2000 by name at the trial because it did not come into 
existence until after Northview's SSAs were terminated. See 
app. at 68, 164-65. Northview argues, however, that the 
plan was in place before its formal adoption and operated 
to eliminate stand alone Jeep and Eagle dealerships like 
Northview and replace them with dealerships selling both 
Jeeps and Eagles and other Chrysler lines such as Dodge 
or Plymouth. 
 
In support of its Plan 2000 theory, Northview presented 
evidence of a number of stand alone Jeep and Eagle 
dealerships that were closed only to have been reopened 
later at nearby dealerships of other Chrysler lines. See, e.g., 
app. at 550-54 (listing 6 Jeep and Eagle dealerships, of over 
50 in its region, that were closed and combined with 
another Chrysler brand). There is noticeably absent from 
the evidence Northview presented, however, any evidence 
that Chrysler forced these Jeep and Eagle dealerships to 
close, that the closed dealerships suffered difficulties 
similar to Northview, or that the closing and later reopening 
of the dealerships was not a beneficial change for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Northview has waived any argument that the district court erred in 
dismissing its breach of contract cause of action as all of its arguments 
in its brief with respect to the judgment as a matter of law are addressed 
to the ADDCA. See Society Hill Tower Owners' Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 
168, 185 (3d Cir. 2000). In any event, the district court correctly 
granted 
the Rule 50(a) motion on all issues being tried. 
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parties involved. Northview asserts that a reasonable 
inference to be drawn from evidence of the mere closing of 
certain Jeep and Eagle dealerships is that Chrysler was 
motivated to bring about the wrongful termination of all 
stand alone Jeep and Eagle dealerships such as Northview. 
Based upon the evidence presented, however, this is not a 
reasonable inference from the evidence but instead is a leap 
of faith. As mentioned, there was no evidence presented to 
suggest any connection between the closings or to suggest 
that the closings resulted from coercion on the part of 
Chrysler. 
 
As argued by Chrysler: 
 
       If this marketing plan had been in effect since 1987, 
       one would expect that Northview would have been able 
       to supply evidence of one dealer that was terminated or 
       consolidated pursuant to the plan. If Chrysler had a 
       four-year old plan to get rid of stand alone Jeep/Eagle 
       dealers, where was the evidence of a single dealer that 
       fell prey to the plan? There was none. 
 
Appellee Br. at 36. Chrysler is correct on this point; 
Northview did not present evidence of any dealership 
"falling prey" to the alleged marketing plan. In the absence 
of such evidence, or at least some evidence that the 
dealership closings that were proffered were not desired by 
the owners and were connected in some manner, Northview 
is not entitled to the inference it desires, namely that since 
1987 Chrysler was operating under a plan to close all stand 
alone Jeep and Eagle dealerships. No reasonable jury could 
draw this inference from the facts presented at trial. 
 
As mentioned, the ADDCA does not protect dealers 
against all unfair practices, but only against those 
"evidenced by acts of coercion or intimidation." Salco Corp. 
v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d at 573. The case law 
plainly requires a plaintiff to present evidence of actual, or 
threatened, coercion or intimidation. See Bob Maxfield, Inc., 
637 F.2d at 1038. While we recognize that a manufacturer 
could coerce a dealer by placing it in a difficultfinancial 
position, Northview has not presented evidence of coercion 
or intimidation in this case. Although there may be 
evidence that Chrysler and Northview had difficulty 
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understanding and dealing with each other, such difficulty 
is not actionable under the ADDCA. See, e.g., Gage v. 
General Motors Corp., 796 F.2d 345, 350-51 (10th Cir. 
1986) (arbitrary decision making on part of manufacturer 
does not constitute violation of ADDCA). A difficult business 
relationship is not, in and of itself, coercion or intimidation. 
In the absence of evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could have inferred that Chrysler coerced or intimidated 
Northview, or threatened coercive action against it, the 
district court correctly granted Chrysler's Rule 50 Motion.11 
 
In addition, the other evidence of wrongful intent 
proffered by Northview was insufficient to create a question 
for the jury. For example, Northview presented evidence 
that Chrysler did not provide the dealership with sufficient 
numbers of the more desirable and faster selling models of 
the Jeep Cherokee. The evidence offered, however, 
demonstrated that dealers across the country were 
experiencing similar problems. See exhs. at 1-2, 3, 4. 
Northview did not offer evidence that it suffered shortages 
different than those of any other dealer. Thus, in the 
absence of evidence of discriminatory treatment, no jury 
reasonably could have concluded that Chrysler was 
motivated by its desire to close the Northview dealership in 
its allocation decisions and thus was coercing Northview by 
injuring it financially. 
 
Further, despite arguing that it was forced to order 
unwanted vehicles, Northview did not present any evidence 
of specific unwanted vehicles that Chrysler forced it to 
order. Rather, Northview presented evidence that Chrysler 
recommended that Northview order the mix of vehicles that 
Chrysler was producing in order to receive its full allocation 
of vehicles. See app. at 292. From this evidence, Northview 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Chrysler argues that Northview's failure to take care of its 
customers, 
or otherwise properly run its business, caused its closing. While this 
may be so, and indeed we are tempted to acknowledge as much, 
particularly in view of Northview's consumer fraud problems, we refrain 
from doing so as there is a dispute of fact on this point, and we are 
obliged in considering the Rule 50(a) order to view the evidence in a 
light 
most favorable to Northview. Our point is that regardless of what 
Northview did or did not do, Chrysler was entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law with respect to its conduct. 
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argues that Chrysler was attempting to coerce the 
dealership into ordering unwanted vehicles. The only fair 
reading of the evidence, however, is that Chrysler was 
suggesting that Northview order the mix of vehicles so that 
it could be guaranteed to receive more vehicles. There was 
nothing preventing Northview from ordering a greater 
number of more desirable vehicles than it was allocated, 
but it would have had to wait for other dealers' allocations 
to be met first and then have its excess orders satisfied by 
any surplus. See app. at 809-10. No reasonable jury could 
have concluded that such actions were coercive within the 
meaning of the ADDCA. See, e.g., Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Corp., 11 F. Supp.2d 737, 744 (D. Md. 1996) 
(granting summary judgment in favor of manufacturer upon 
finding that under ADDCA dealer is entitled only to cars 
due under allocation system, not to all the automobiles it 
requests). 
 
Also, the evidence presented at trial merely demonstrated 
that Chrysler, on occasion, either urged or recommended 
that Northview order, stock, and sell all models of all 
vehicle lines. The SSAs, however, obligated Northview to 
market and sell all Jeep and Eagle models energetically and 
aggressively. See exhs. at 152. In addition, neither the 
recommendations of a manufacturer nor the actual 
solicitation of vehicle orders rises to the level of a violation 
of the ADDCA and they hardly can be viewed as coercive 
tactics. See Autohaus Brugger, Inc., 567 F.2d at 913. At 
trial, Northview did not present evidence to suggest that 
Chrysler did anything more than make suggestions or 
recommendations. While it may be true that Chrysler stated 
the only way Northview could be guaranteed more vehicles 
would be to order in the suggested manner, the evidence 
could not support a conclusion that Chrysler used coercion 
or intimidation to force Northview to order unwanted 
vehicles. Northview was free to order the vehicles it desired, 
in the numbers it desired, if it were willing to take the 
chance that there would be a sufficient supply after all 
dealer allocations were met to meet its demand. 
 
We recognize that Northview presented evidence that 
Chrysler failed to explain properly its warranty 
reimbursement system and the EPUR. See app. at 313-14, 
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332. Again, this problem was one that dealers suffered 
universally. See id. at 315. The evidence presented could 
not provide a foundation for a conclusion that Chrysler 
subjected Northview to discriminatory treatment, i.e., that 
Chrysler singled it out for warranty audits or that stand 
alone dealerships in particular were subjected to the 
audits. Moreover, Northview's evidence did not permit a 
finding that: (1) the warranty audit was not warranted; (2) 
its placement on a more restrictive warranty approval 
system was not appropriate under the circumstances; or (3) 
the audit or Northview's placement on the more restrictive 
approval system interfered in any way with its ability to 
operate the dealership profitably. In the absence of 
sufficient evidence to support these conclusions, it would 
be unreasonable for a jury to infer that Chrysler used the 
warranty audit as a means of coercing Northview to 
relinquish its franchise. 
 
Northview suggests that, when viewing the evidence, a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that Chrysler, by its 
actions and omissions, made it impossible for Northview to 
operate profitably. Acceptance of this argument, however, 
would require viewing evidence concerning vehicle ordering 
and supply, warranty audits, and animosity as substantive 
evidence to support a damages recovery. As mentioned, 
Northview was prevented from proffering such evidence for 
that purpose and has not raised any argument here to 
suggest that the court's limitation was erroneous. 
Accordingly, Northview is not entitled to the inference it 
desires. Moreover, the evidence could not support an 
inference of coercion or intimidation as is required by the 
ADDCA. 
 
As a final matter, we note that the SSAs were terminated 
by operation of section 28, which states that the failure of 
a dealership to operate its business for seven consecutive 
business days automatically terminates the SSAs without 
notice. See exhs. at 162. Thus, notwithstanding Chrysler's 
having mailed Northview a notice of termination in July 
1991, in light of our analysis of the evidence we are 
satisfied that a reasonable jury could not have concluded 
that the termination of the SSAs pursuant to section 28 
supports a cause of action under the ADDCA. See, e.g., 
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Dick Winning Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 750 F.2d 895, 899-900 (11th Cir. 1985) (no violation 
of ADDCA where franchise termination was in accordance 
with express terms of agreement); Globe Motors, Inc. v. 
Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645, 648-49 (3d Cir. 
1964). Overall, we are satisfied that the district court 
properly granted Chrysler's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, even when we exercise the generous 
standard of review owed to Northview on its appeal from the 




For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the March 7, 
1995 and February 9, 1996 orders of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of Chrysler as to 
Northview's BVA and UCC good faith claims. We also affirm 
the September 28, 1999 order granting Chrysler's motion 
for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a). 
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